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Abstract.  
Using Japanese prefecture level data for the years between 1988 and 2001, this 
paper explores how and the extent to which social capital has an effect on the 
damage resulting from natural disasters.  It also examines whether the experience 
of a natural disaster affects individual and collective protection against future 
disasters.  Using regression analysis and controlling for various factors such as the 
proportion of poor people, per capita income, and the number of natural disasters, 
there are three major findings.  (1) Social capital reduces the damage caused by 
natural disasters. (2) The risk of a natural disaster makes people more apt to 
cooperate and therefore social capital is more effective to prevent disasters. (3) 
Economic conditions such as the level of income distinctly affect any damage, but 
hardly influence it when the scale of a disaster is small.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A growing number of empirical works in the social sciences, including 
economics, have attempted to investigate issues regarding natural disasters (e.g., 
Albala-Bertland 1993, Burton et al. 1993, Garret & Sobel 2003, Tol & Leek 1999)1.  
One feature of natural disasters is that they appear to be caused by natural 
conditions and cannot be perfectly forecasted. This obviously leads to possible 
economic risks.  Hence, Sawada and Shimizutani (2007) explored consumption 
insurance against natural disasters. Such an exogenous shock is likely to have 
tremendous effect on the degree of investment in physical and human capital, 
thereby affecting economic growth ( Kellenberg & Monbarak 2008; Skidmore & Toya, 
2002).  Because of these features, humans fail to control for the occurrence of a 
natural disaster.  Recent research, however, provides evidence that the degree of 
economic development, captured by the quality of institutions, social heterogeneity, 
social capital, and per capita income, has an important effect on the outcomes of 
natural disasters, although it cannot prevent them (Anbarci et al., 2005; Burton et 
al., 1993; Escaleras et al., 2007; Kahn, 2005; Tol & Leek, 1999; Toya & Skidmore, 
2007).   
Public sector corruption leads contractors to ignore a country‟s building codes 
and so buildings often fall short of the appropriate construction standards.  This is 
a reason why public sector corruption is positively associated with earthquake 
deaths (Escalera et al., 2007).  Institutional quality seems to be reflected in the 
degree to which a country is based on democracy.  The evidence presented by Kahn 
(2005) shows that countries with a more democratic political system suffer less 
deaths from natural disasters.  Anbarci et al. (2005) suggests, based upon economic 
theory, that collective action plays a critical role in saving lives when a natural 
disaster occurs; therefore, economic inequality hampers collective action and has a 
detrimental effect on disaster damage.  On the other hand, social capital is likely to 
promote people to participate in civic life and so take collective action, resulting in 
economic benefit2.  Social capital is found to be more easily formed in a society 
where economic and ethnic heterogeneity is smaller (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; 
Costa & Kahn, 2003; Vigdor, 2004, Yamamura 2008b)3.  „Social capital may mitigate 
                                                   
1 As well, a growing number of reports on hurricane Katrina have been published 
(e.g., Congleton 2006, Shughart II 2006, Sobel and Leeson 2006, Ewing et al. 2007, 
Landry 2007, Chappell 2007, Boettke 2007, Whitt and Wilson 2007, Eckel 2007). 
2 A number of reports have attempted to investigate social capital (Berggren & 
Jordahl 2006, Knack & Keefer 1997, Putnam 2000).  
3 Generalized trust profoundly associated with social capital also depends on the 
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neighborhood instability and promote neighborhood cohesion‟ (Kan 2007, p. 437).  
As a result, social capital is expected to mitigate the damage caused by disasters via 
the enhancement of collective action.  Little attention has, however, been given to 
the role of social capital on the alleviation of damage from a natural disaster.   
Prior to natural disasters, people with a great amount of relevant information 
are less likely to suffer serious damage than those with less knowledge.  Reports 
(Jovanovic, 1982; Jovanovic & Narko, 1996; Lucas, 1993) note that learning from 
past experience possibly enhances the accumulation of human capital, leading to 
economic growth.  The argument of Jovanovic (1982) that a corporate entity 
knowing the optimal cost structure based upon a Bayesian learning process is 
similar in that an economic entity can more efficiently allocate resources through its 
experience.  Such a learning mechanism is also considered to be applicable to the 
way natural disasters are dealt with.  That is to say, people who have experienced 
natural disasters can obtain correct information about protecting against such 
events or getting out of them (Anbarci et al., 2005; Escaleras et al, 2007).  
Experience of disasters appears to be helpful for mitigating disaster damage, 
not only at individual and government levels, but also at the community level.  
People seem to learn from their experiences of disasters and obtained relevant 
information about how a community member can take collective action to protect 
against them, and how the degree to which cooperative behavior benefits an 
individual by reducing damage.  Therefore, prior information about protection 
against disasters is considered to have an important effect on the efficacy of social 
capital to reduce disaster damage.  Nevertheless, studies dealing with the 
determinants of damage arising from natural disasters do not pay much attention to 
how social capital is associated with the collective learning effect.  The purpose of 
this paper is to examine the extent to which social capital and the experience of 
natural disasters reduce damage. As well, it examines whether experience leads 
social capital to be more effective in mitigating damage.  Furthermore, although 
Japan is a developed country, Japan society remains relatively homogeneous and 
social capital deeply accumulated; therefore, people are more inclined to take 
collective action (Yamamura, 2008b).  Such a feature of Japan allows me to test how 
and the extent to which social capital is effective in a developed country. 
The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section 2 briefly surveys 
relationships between social capital and natural disasters, and advances a testable 
hypothesis.  Section 3 presents a simple econometric framework.  Section 4 
discusses the results of the estimations.  The final section offers concluding 
                                                                                                                                                
features of the social structure (Leigh 2006a, 2006b, Bjørnskov, 2006). 
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observations. 
 
2. Social capital and natural disasters  
 
Occurrences of natural disasters are unequally distributed around the world. 
As they are over concentrated in some areas, the importance of disaster measures 
differs among countries.  According to the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 
(2007), 21 % of earthquakes of magnitude 6 and over occurred in Japan, although 
Japan landmass is only 0.25% of World‟s4.  This implies that, compared with other 
countries, Japan should frequently suffer earthquake related natural disasters and 
therefore economic loss resulting from these should be recognizable. Therefore, 
protection against such damage is considered a central issue of economic policy. 
Compared to countries bordered by other ones, Japan‟s island condition is a natural 
limiting factor on the inflow of foreigners and influences from other cultures5. 
Therefore Japanese society continues to be relatively homogeneous.  The more 
homogeneous a society is, the easier it is for collective action to take place and the 
more profoundly people trust each other (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; 2002).  
Ethnic and economic fragmentation are reported to have detrimental effects on 
damage arising from natural disasters, leading to increases in fatalities (Anbarci et 
al., 2003; Kahn, 2005).  If this is the case, it is cogent to examine how Japan, 
characterized by a homogeneous society and frequent earthquakes, copes with 
natural disasters (Horwich, 2000; Sawada & Shimizutani, 2007)6.  
Information about how people and government become better at coping with 
                                                   
4 Japan incurred 13 % of the total amount of damage resulting from natural 
disasters worldwide during the past 30 years (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 
2007). 
5 Yamamura (2008b) indicated that the Hirfindahl-type index used of the ethnic 
fragmentation of Japan is 0.02.  As suggested in Alesina et al. (2003), the value of 
Japan is smaller not only than that of the USA (0.49) but also the UK (0.12) 
characterized by the same island geography as Japan.  A historical feature of Japan 
that illustrates an important difference from the UK should be considered to explain 
how the homogeneous Japanese character was formed.  It is widely understood that 
the rulers of Japan during the Tokugawa period between 1639 and 1859 adopted a 
closed door policy (Sugiyama 1987).  The policy of seclusion was initiated as a 
response to the perceived threat posed by Christian coverts in Japan.  Such a policy 
aided by Japan‟s island geography is thought to have formed the fundamental 
homogeneous feature of Japanese society, which has persisted even after Japan 
opened up to world trade and to international exchanges.   
6 In Japan, social capital enhances learning from others such as from the diffusion of 
home computers (Yamamura, 2008a), makes a contribution to collective action such 
as responses to the Census (Yamamura, 2008b), and acts as informal deterrents 
against dangerously driving (Yamamura, 2008c). 
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disasters, an ability that is obtained through experience, is considered to play a 
critical role in mitigating the damage arising from a disaster (Anbarci.et.al., 2005; 
Escaleras et al., 2007).  An example is the Kobe, Japan, earthquake “The 
earthquake struck a community, almost no member of which expected it.  It has 
been almost a millennium since an event of comparative magnitude had occurred in 
the Kansai (Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto).  Even business and agencies that had previously 
drawn up emergency plans were caught by surprise and were unable to implement 
them” (Horwich, 2000. p.529).   Under such conditions, local government agencies 
were unprepared and so failed to coordinate the inflow of goods and services from 
outside the stricken area (Horwich, 2000). This was in part because of the lack of 
experience of a natural disaster in Kobe7.   
Delays in the initial response by the local government system were singled out 
for criticism in the aftermath of the Kobe Earthquake.  On the other hand, much 
attention was given to role of the informal cooperative activity such as voluntary 
disaster control organizations in reducing the damage arising from that natural 
disaster.  This is probably because voluntary organizations are thought to play 
important roles in coordinating collective action to reduce damage.  An area where 
people are more inclined to participate in voluntary activity is hence considered to 
have deeply accumulated social capital (Putnam, 2000)8 .  There appear to be 
channels through which experiencing disasters affects social capital and thereby 
influences victims of disasters.  An area that tends to regularly suffer from natural 
disasters has more inclination to diffuse information concerning preventive 
measures among its communities; therefore, it reinforces the functions of social 
capital to cope with risk through collective learning.  As a consequence, social 
capital plays a greater role in mitigating damage from disasters if community 
members frequently experience such disasters9.  From the discussion as above, two 
hypotheses can be derived: 
 
Hypothesis 1: An area with highly accumulated social capital has a tendency to 
                                                   
7 During the period of recovery from the Kobe earthquake, the city‟s fire department 
built a new observation and control center and its emergency management process 
has been reorganized and enlarged (Horwich, 2000). 
8 Putnam (2000) points out that social capital has a positive effect but also has a 
detrimental one upon human behavior.  Durlauf (1999) asserts that social capital 
facilitates intragroup coordination by enhancing group identity, which, in turn, may 
promote intergroup hostility. 
9 It is also likely that social capital will make a community more resilient; that is, 
the community is more likely to recover quickly from a disaster.  When hurricane 
Katrina occurred, the Catholic Church in New Orleans helped organize crews of 
returning residents to assist one another repairing homes (Boettke et al. 2007). 
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have less victims of natural disasters.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Prior experience of disaster reinforces the function of social capital 
through a learning process, resulting in a reduction of victim numbers. 
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data and model 
     The data set used in this study is a survey panel of 47 prefectures covering 14 
years from 1988 to 2001.  Table 1 includes variable definitions, means, standard 
deviations, coefficients of variation, and maximums and minimums of analyzed data.  
The variables are discussed later.  Number of victims, numbers of natural disasters, 
per capita income, number of fire fighting teams, and the number of immigrants are 
derived from Index Publishing (2006).  Data about the numbers of natural disasters 
used in this research comprise the numbers of roads, bridges, banks that suffered 
from disasters and the numbers of landslides; all of which can be viewed as outcomes 
of earthquakes and hurricanes.  Therefore, the magnitude of an earthquake and the 
intensity of a hurricane are considered to be reflected in the “number of disasters”.  
There is wide range of intensities of natural disasters such as earthquakes and 
hurricanes.  For instance, earthquakes occur every day but most are too weak to be 
perceived and therefore have no impact on people.  Accordingly, I confront a 
difficulty in accurately counting natural disasters.  The method of counting seems 
to affect the results and so cause an estimation bias.  This is the reason why I 
considered observable outcomes of a “natural disaster” as disasters10.    The total 
population number and the population subgroup over 70 years old, the number of 
those receiving public assistance, the number of policemen, the numbers of houses, 
public baths, and community centers, are from the Asahi Newspaper (2004).  Some 
variables, including the numbers of public baths, community centers and fire 
fighting teams are divided by the population to obtain per capita values.  The 
proportions of elderly and those receiving public assistance are calculated from the 
number over 70 years old, and the number receiving public assistance divided by the 
total population number, respectively. 
  There are several reports that have investigated fatalities in natural 
disasters (Anbarci et al. 2005, Escaleras et al. 2007, Kahn 2005); however, these 
                                                   
10 The number of intense hurricanes and earthquakes can be obtained from 
National Astronomical Observatory Japan (2006).  The similar results were 
provided when these data are used. 
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cover only a portion of the victims of disasters and so do not accurately reflect the 
full damage caused11.  Thus this paper considers all victims as observed at the 
moment of an event.  VICTIM, for which this paper attempts to examine 
determinants, is a non-negative count of victims of natural disasters.  As such, a 
basic, and appropriate, estimation method is the poisson model.  However, a 
shortcoming of the poisson model for this analysis is its assumption of an equal 
conditional mean and variance for the dependent variable.  That is, to be 
appropriate in our case, the poisson model requires the conditional mean of VICTIM 
to be equal to its variance.  As such, the poisson model is best applied in conditions 
where there is limited variation in the dependent variable.   However, from Table1 
it can be seen that maximum and minimum values are 62,085 and 0 respectively, 
and the standard deviation is 4,314, indicating the variation of the dependent 
variable is clearly a large one.  As well, an over-dispersion of the number of victims 
is manifest in Table 2, showing the percentile rank.  Numbers of victims in the 
lowest percentile, the 10th percentile, is 1 whereas that of the highest is 1645.  
Taking table 1 into account, the mean value, 914, is above the 80th percentile.  
Hence, careful attention must be paid to the over-dispersion of dependent variables 
when estimations are conducted.  In such a situation, the use of a poisson process to 
estimate typically causes a downward bias in the model‟s standard errors.  In line 
with reports concerning fatalities arising from natural disasters (Escaleras et al, 
2007), a negative binominal model should be employed since this model generalizes 
the poisson process by expressly relaxing the assumption of an equal conditional 
mean and variance through the introduction of a parameter accounting for any 
unobserved heterogeneity between observations.  What is more, using the 
zero-inflated negative binominal model introduces a splitting process, thus 
considering a zero victims account (Kahn(2005). Estimation by the zero-inflated 
negative binominal model uses a logit where the dependent variable equals 1 if there 
is no victim arising from a disaster.  The logit model includes the number of natural 
disasters in year t and the interaction of its account with income.   
 
3.2  Function form 
  Following the discussion above, the estimated function of the number of victims 
then takes the following form12: 
                                                   
11 Toya & Skidmore (2007) explored not only fatalities but also the index of economic 
damage measured by the estimated damage in real US $ when disasters occurred. 
12 Values of coefficients can be interpreted as the elasticity of the number of victims 
with respect to the corresponding independent variables, which are evaluated at the 
sample mean values of the variables.   
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VICTIM it= 0 +1NDISit +2AVDISit + 3PBATHit  + 4PBATHit * AVDISit + 
5CENTEit + 6CENTEit * AVDISit + 7FFIGHTit + 8FFIGHTt * 
AVDISit  + 9POLICit +  10IMIGit + 11 POPit + 12PORATit + 
13OLDRATit +14INCOMit + +νt +ωit , 
where VICTIM represents the number of victims in prefecture i in year t, and ‟s 
represents the regression parameters.ν t  represent the unobservable specific 
effects of year t (a fixed effect time vector)respectively; ωit represents the error 
term.   
As mentioned, the structure of the data set used in this study is a survey panel 
of 47 prefectures covering the 14 years from 1988 to 2001.  Macroeconomic 
conditions will be captured inνt, and I incorporate each year‟s dummy variables to 
restrain the time specific effects.      
Though it seems obvious, it needs noting that an area can only contain victims of 
natural disasters if a natural disaster actually takes place there.  Following 
Kahn(2005), in the logit model of the splitting stage where the number of disasters 
that a prefecture i experiences in year t and its interaction term of the log form of per 
capita income and population size, which are represented as NDIS, 
NDIS*Ln(INCOME) and NDIS*Ln(POP) respectively, are incorporated as 
independent variables.  The interaction term of a disaster‟s count with income level 
and population would account for the possibility that prefectures with higher 
incomes and smaller populations are less inclined to suffer victims from disasters 
that occur.  NDIS*INCOME and NDIS*POP are thus expected to take positive and 
negative signs since the logit model estimates the probability that nobody in a given 
prefecture in a given year becomes a victim of a natural disaster. 
I now proceed to discuss determinants of the number of victims.  The number of 
disasters, represented as NDIS, in year t and in prefecture i convincingly increases 
the number of victims and therefore takes a negative coefficient sign.  As earlier 
discussed, people who experience disasters are better able to acquire information 
useful for preventing the effects of natural disasters, and so to reduce damage 
through leaning processes.  To test this hypothesis, AVDIS, the average number of 
disasters occurring in past years is included as an explanatory variable to capture 
disaster experience13.  The choice of the past years seems to have an effect upon the 
outcomes of estimation. If the prediction is supported, the sign of AVDIS becomes 
                                                   
13 Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. (2007) reports that the past experience of 
disasters encourage people to take precautions against future disasters, whereas the 
effect of experience on cautious behavior diminishes as time passes.  Therefore, this 
paper restricts past experiences to those within three years. 
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negative.  To check the robustness of the results, I use three alternative variables 
(1) number of disaster occurring in the past year, namely, years t-1 in prefecture i,  
(2) the average number of disasters occurring from years t-1 to t-3 in prefecture i,  
(3) the average number of disasters occurring from years t-1 to t-5 in prefecture i.  
Furthermore, the importance of the experience of a natural disaster seems to change 
as time passes.  These alternative variables also allow me to examine how and the 
extent to which passing time affects residents‟ behavior against a natural disaster.   
The following independent variables are used as proxies of social capital.  In 
traditional Japanese daily life, public baths were used by community members who, 
apart from the wealthy, ordinarily lived in houses without a private bath.  Through 
the use of such baths people could get acquainted with neighbors and generate a 
social network.  In modern Japan, most residences have their own baths, and 
people are therefore more likely to take a bath at home.  However, a new type of 
public bath featuring more deluxe baths and saunas has recently developed, and 
these are used by all sectors of society, thus providing a place to meet neighbors and 
form social capital (Yamamura 2008a).  The number of public baths, represented as 
PBATH, can thus serve as a proxy for social capital.  Therefore, the signs of PBATH 
are predicted to be negative. People are more likely to trust each other and then take 
collective action if there is a place where they can communicate with each other and 
if the community is well organized (Putnam, 2000).  CNETE, which is the number 
of community centers, is a proxy for social capital.  Hence, the signs of CENTE are 
expected to be negative. 
Earthquakes, as one of their results, are likely to entail fires as secondary 
events.  Modern Japanese society is rooted in a system of group responsibility 
within a community.  For instance, the community fire-fighting team, represented 
as FFIGHT originated in the Edo period and continues today (Goto 2001).  
Community fire-fighting teams, informal institutions, are still called for today 
because of the scarcity of public firehouses, which are regarded as formal 
institutions, and hence act as substitutes for public firehouses.  What is more, these 
teams play an important role, not only in deterring fire but also in generating social 
capital through interpersonal communication in a cooperative protective activity 
against disaster (Goto 2001).  Hence, fire-fighting teams are thought to have an 
important disaster prevention role.  Members belonging to such teams also 
regularly patrol within their community to ensure that precautions are taken 
against fire; thereby keeping an eye on the streets, buildings and houses within their 
community.  As a result of such activity, communal fire-fighting teams also function 
as a vigilant corps so that criminal behavior such as robbery, which is likely to occur 
10 
 
after a disaster, is prevented14 .  As a consequence, the signs of FFIGHT are 
expected to be negative. 
As noted before, experience of a natural disaster provides useful information 
concerning protection against future natural disasters, and then reinforces the 
function of social capital to take collective action to mitigate damage from a disaster.  
To test this hypothesis, which is the primary focus of this paper, cross terms between 
proxies of social capital and experience of disasters need to be checked.  That is to 
say, the signs of PBATH*AVDIS, CENTE*AVDIS and FFIGHT*AVDIS are given 
careful attention and are predicted to become negative. 
Police are considered to be the emergency first responder to a natural disaster 
and therefore POLIC is expected to take negative sign.  Frequent movers weaken 
community ties; therefore, communities with higher rates of residential turnover are 
less well integrated. This is why residential mobility tends to undermine 
community-based social capital (Putnam, 2000); thereby hampering the collective 
action required to alleviate damage from a disaster.  Hence, it is possible that the 
coefficients of IMIG, which is the number of immigrants from other prefectures 
arriving during the last year, take a positive sign.  
  The number of victims is expected to become larger in areas where a larger 
number of residents live if the scale of the natural disasters is of the same 
magnitude.    Accordingly, the sign of POP representing total population is 
predicted to become positive.  Lower income people are more likely to suffer from a 
natural disaster since they appear to live in more humble residences.  The 
proportion of poor people thus increases the number of victims of disasters.  In 
Japan, individuals living below a poverty threshold can be in receipt of public 
assistance so that the proportion of those who are in receipt of public assistance, 
which is denoted as PORAT, is regarded to proxy for the poor people rate.  In 
addition, it seems reasonable that elderly people cannot make a quick response in an 
emergency, leading them to become victims.  OLDRAT, which stands for the 
proportion of those over 70 years old, is incorporate to capture such an effect.  
Accordingly, PORAT and OLDRAT will also take a positive sign. 
 INCOM, representing per capita income is used to capture economic conditions.  
The number of victims is expected to become larger in areas where a larger number 
of residents live if the scale of the natural disasters is of the same magnitude.  
Areas with higher income are convincingly more able to build earthquake resistant 
                                                   
14 Lederman et al (2002) uses international data to examine the social capital effect 
upon crime and suggests that countries with larger social capital are more apt to 
have reduced crime rates. 
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buildings and provide anti-earth quake equipment.  Accordingly, the signs of 
INCOM are predicted to become negative. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the zero inflated negative binominal 
estimations.  In both tables, columns (1), (4), (7), and (10) show the results when the 
number of disasters occurring in the past year is used as AVDIS.  Columns (2), (5), 
(8) and (11) show the results when the average number of disasters occurring in the 
past three years is used as AVDIS.  Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) show the results 
when the average number of disasters occurring in the past five years is used as 
AVDIS. To properly compare the results, values presented in the upper panel are the 
elasticity, which is evaluated at the sample mean values of the dependent and each 
independent variable. The results of Table 3 were estimated using all samples, 658 
observations.  As explained before, the zero inflated negative binominal model is 
employed to take into account the effect of outliers; thus it seems reasonable to ask 
whether the outcomes of estimations are at least somewhat influenced by outliers.  
As discussed for Tables 1 and 2 in the previous section, the sample is indeed skewed.  
To take this into account and to check the robustness of the outcome presented in 
Table 4, re-estimations are conducted when samples are restricted to those under 
100 victims and therefore the observations become 356.   
  
4.1. Logit estimation 
 In the bottom part of both tables, the results of the logit model of the splitting 
stage are reported. The cross term of NDIS and POP shows a negative sign for the 
coefficient in all estimations. Furthermore, the results of Tables 3 and 4 indicate 
statistical significance at the 1 % level in all estimations.  Although contrary to the 
prediction, the signs of the cross terms of NDIS and INCOM become negative, but 
are not statistically significant in all estimations.  Overall, these results are 
consistent with the prediction that larger population areas are more likely to have 
victims when a disaster occurs.  
 
4.2. Estimation results using all samples 
I now discuss the results of the negative binominal model after the splitting 
stage in Table 3.  The significant positive signs of NDIS in all estimations of Table 3 
are compatible with the prediction.  With respect to AVDIS, all results show 
negative signs. As shown in the second row of columns (1) and (2), the fact that 
AVDIS is statistically significant, reveals that the learning effect makes a 
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contribution to decreasing the number of victims.  Nevertheless, column (3) is 
insignificant statistically, and its absolute value of 0.02 is remarkably smaller than 
those of (1) and (2).  It follows from this that past experience reduces victim 
numbers but its effect diminishes as time passes.  
   With respect to the proxies for social capital, in columns (1), (2) and (3), 
CENTE , PBATH and FFIGHT take the anticipated negative sign of CENTE.  In 
particular, CENTE is significant at the 1 % level.  This indicates that social capital 
alleviates damage from disasters.  Any insignificance of PBATH and FFIGHT are 
likely to be driven by potential shortcomings such as the skewness of the sample 
caused by outliers15.  To investigate the learning effect through the experience of a 
disaster on the effectiveness of social capital, I check the results of the cross term of 
AVNDIS with proxies of social capital such as PBATH*AVNDIS, CNETE*AVNDIS 
and FFIGHT*AVNDS.  As predicted previously, in all the of the interaction terms, 
their signs become negative.  They become statistically significant when past 
experience is measured by the number of disaster occurring in the past year and in 
the past three years, but they become insignificant in the case using the number in 
the past five years.  Furthermore, as shown in column (6), the absolute value of 
PBATH * AVDIS, which is 0.01 for both, is distinctly smaller than in columns (4) and 
(5), which are 0.06 and 0.04, respectively.  The same tendency is observed 
concerning CENTE * AVDIS in columns (7)-(9) and FFIGHT * AVDIS in columns 
(10)-(12), indicating that the absolute values when AVDIS is calculated by the 
natural disasters in the past five years are by far smaller than the other values.   
Restricting attention to the results in the case that AVNDIS is calculated by data of 
the past year and the past three years, the absolute values of AVDIS and its 
interaction terms are between 0.04 and 0.08, indicating their elasticity is relatively 
modest.  In line with the prediction, these results imply that the experience of a 
disaster accumulates the human capital necessary to protect against a future one; 
this then reinforces the function of social capital to coordinate collective action when 
a disaster occurs.  Nevertheless, such an interaction effect has a tendency to 
disappear as time passes.   
Contrary to the prediction, the signs of POLIC become positive, though 
insignificant, meaning that the police did not make a contribution to a reduction of 
victims.  In all estimations, the significant negative signs of IMIG suggested that a 
                                                   
15 Another possible reason for their unpredicted can be found in the argument of 
Lederman et al. (2002), that the indicators of social capital they defined reflect both 
group-specific and society-wide social capital, which are expected to promote and 
reduce collective action, respectively.  Therefore these opposite effects neutralize 
each other. 
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decay of social capital causes impediments to the success of collective action, thereby 
increasing the number of victims.   
Consistent with the prediction, in all estimations, POP take significant 
predicted signs and their values are larger than 4.  As well, PORAT and OLDRAT 
take their anticipated signs although PORAT are not significant; indicating that 
poor and old individuals are more inclined to suffer from disasters.  INCOM take 
their significant predicted signs and their values are larger than 3.  From this can 
be derived the fact that the economic condition tremendously affects on the number 
of victims.  Especially, the fact that if income rises 1 %, the number of victims 
decreases by about 4 %; reflecting that areas with higher incomes can to a large 
extent afford to protect against disasters. 
 
4.3. Estimation results with the victims restriction 
The determinants of the number of victims appear to depend on the 
magnitude of the disaster, while the skewness of the sample seems to influence the 
results, as argued by Escaleras et al. (2007).  For a closer examination to take into 
these issues into account, I re-estimated using the same model but in which samples 
were restricted to a number of victims smaller than 10016.  These results are shown 
in Table 4.  Looking at columns (1) and (2) reveals in regard to AVNDIS, as reported 
in the second row, significant negative signs and the value of the coefficient. Column 
(3) suggests insignificance and a smaller value.  Turning to the effects of social 
capital as captured by PBATH, CENTE, and FFIGHT, with the exception of PBATH, 
the coefficient signs become negative.  These results are almost the same when all 
samples are used, as discussed before.    It follows from the results discussed so far 
that not only a learning effect but also social capital are negatively associated with 
the number of victims resulting from natural disasters.   
Switching attention to columns (4)-(12), where the cross terms of disaster 
experience and social capital are reported, I next examine how the learning effect 
reinforces social capital.  Consistent with the prediction, all signs of 
PBATH*AVNDIS, CNETE*AVNDIS and FFIGHT*AVNDS are negative, and are 
equivalent to those presented in Table 3.  In terms of the absolute values of the 
coefficients shown in columns (4),(5), (7),(8),(10), and (11), AVDIS and its interaction 
terms are between 0.02 and 0.06, suggesting they are almost at the same level as in 
                                                   
16 While the estimation results shown in table 3 are based on the zero-inflated 
negative binominal model designed to take into account the effect of outliers, it 
seems reasonable to question whether the outliers matter since the sample is skewed 
as mentioned previously. 
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Table 3.   On the other hand, when I used AVNDIS calculated using data from the 
past five years, they are not statistically significant and the absolute values become 
pronouncedly smaller.  Taken together, the impacts on disaster damage of learning, 
social capital and their interaction do not disappear even when the scale of natural 
disasters is small, so long as the focus is on disaster experiences limited to those 
within a few years.  Put another way, these effects are stable regardless of which 
samples are used and so are not affected by the scale of a disaster.  Hence, the 
estimation results concerning Hypotheses 1 and 2 are robust under the different 
samples, indicating that Hypotheses 1 and 2 are strongly supported.  Nevertheless, 
it is very interesting to observe that these effects diminish strikingly when I take 
more distant past events into account.  According to the Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan (2007), people in Japan are likely to take measures to cope 
with a natural disaster immediately after they experience a disaster but cease from 
doing so as time passes.  From this I derive the argument that the precautions 
against the risk of a disaster surge as an outcome of a disaster experience but then 
gradually decrease over time.  The findings I have presented thus far are 
considered to reflect the feature of human behavior pointed out by the Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan (2007) .     
I found it interesting that the coefficients of INCOM in Table 4, contrary to 
expectations, take positive signs in all columns.  Accordingly, in respect to the per 
capita income, there is remarkable difference from those reported in Table 3 showing 
negative significant signs.  What is more, the coefficient values INCOM are smaller 
than 1.00; far smaller than those shown in Table3.  I derived from this that 
economic conditions are not associated with disaster damage when disasters are 
small in scale.  Combining the estimation results in Tables 3 and 4 indicates that 
the effects of economic conditions on disaster damage are affected by the restriction 
of samples.   The fact that higher incomes are more likely to reduce the number of 
victims does not persist when samples are restricted to a small number of victims.  I 
interpret these results as follows.  According to the theoretical model developed by 
Anbarci et al. (2005), the per capita level of income increases the provability of 
collective action in the form of the creation and enforcement of building codes, 
appropriate professional licensing, and earthquake-sensitive zoning17.  That is, 
areas where income is at a high level have more ability to cope with natural 
disasters, mainly through the intensification of physical structures such as the 
provision of earthquake-resistant buildings, fire proof-buildings, and/or 
                                                   
17 The collective action required here is different from that required for informal 
voluntary activity promoted by social capital. 
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fire-prevention equipment.  Such measures seem to be effective in alleviating the 
damage when inordinate scale disasters strike buildings.  In the case where the 
magnitude of a disaster is, however, too modest to damage the physical structure, 
economic conditions such as per capita income do not affect outcomes. 
To sum the evidence presented so far; factors concerning disaster experience and 
social capital for reducing disaster damage persist even with the different samples.  
However, per capita income has tremendous effects on any resulting damage, though 
this relationship disappears because of the restriction of our samples.  The evidence 
above seems to indicate that informal cooperative activity promoted through 
accumulation of social capital plays an important role in alleviating disaster damage, 
especially in cases where the disaster is not of a large scale, being one in which 
economic factors can make no contribution to the reduction of damage. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It is impossible to control the occurrences of natural disasters, but it is possible 
to alleviate damage to some extent.  An example is taking protection action against 
a future natural disaster; indeed, this is an area where local government is expected 
to assume an important role in coping with disasters.  Nevertheless, the Kobe 
earthquake case in Japan shows what can go wrong; in that event, the initial 
response system of the local government organs was delayed and indeed 
malfunctioned, whereas informal cooperative activity such as voluntary disaster 
control organizations responded promptly, resulting in a reduction of the damage 
arising from this natural disaster.  To reduce damage, collective action is called for 
and voluntary organizations are important.  Therefore, informal organizations are 
likely to decrease damage through their collective action in areas where there is high 
social cohesion and therefore people are more inclined to participate in voluntary 
activities.    
Through experiencing a natural disaster, individuals may learn the how to deal 
with a future natural disaster.  As well, this experience is apt to change the attitude 
of individuals regarding disasters.  As larger amounts of information concerning 
natural disasters are obtained, individuals are more likely to perceive latent damage 
resulting from a lack of appropriate measures, and therefore take steps to cope.  
The main aim of this paper has been to examine how and the extent to which 
the experience of a natural disaster, social capital, and their interaction are related 
with damage resulting from natural disasters measured by the number of victims.   
To this end, using prefecture level data of Japan for the years between 1988 and 
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2001, this paper ascertained the determinants of the number of victims of natural 
disasters.  The major findings from this study were: (1) Social capital reduces 
damage resulting from natural disasters. (2) Abundant information concerning 
natural disasters obtained through past experiences makes people more apt to 
cooperate and therefore social capital becomes more effective to prevent disasters.  
Nevertheless, it becomes less effective as time passes after the experience of a 
disaster.    (3) A high level of income makes much more contribution than social 
capital to a reduction in the number of victims; nevertheless, the level of income 
hardly affects the number of victims in small scale disasters, hence social capital 
makes a greater contribution in this situation.     
From the estimations here, I derived an argument that, in general, physical 
equipment and infrastructure against disasters are more effective than cooperative 
behavior, namely collective action, among people.  By contrast, cooperative behavior 
becomes relatively more effective in small scale disasters.  What is more, thanks to 
a spillover of information about natural disasters, cooperative behavior is thought to 
be more easily organized, thereby reducing the damage resulting from such a 
disaster.  The positive effect of the disaster experience on cooperative behavior 
deteriorates as time passes after people experience a disaster, because people‟ 
decrease their precautions against a future disaster.  It follows from this that a 
government should not only provide physical equipment, but should also make 
efforts to transmit more information about natural disasters to stimulate and 
promote collective action by it citizens against disaster. 
This study uses aggregated-level data at a prefecture level and so individual 
responses to natural disasters cannot be considered.  Further, I consider the 
experience of suffering disasters to be a proxy for the quantity of information about 
disasters obtained by people.  This assumption, however, may not be sufficiently 
convincing.  Accordingly, a more appropriate measure for the information acquired 
by people prior to disaster is called for.  For a closer investigation of the findings in 
this paper, more purposefully constructed individual-level data needs to be used.   
These are issues remaining to be addressed in future study. 
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Table 1  
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient of 
variation 
Max Min 
VICTIM 
 
Number of victims  914 4314 4.71 62,085 0 
NDIS 
 
Number of natural disasters 91 262 2.85 4,898 0 
AVNDIS 
(1 year) 
Number of disasters during the past 
year. 
102 289 2.83 4,898 0 
AVNDIS 
(3 Years) 
Average number of disasters during the 
past three years. 
103 169 1.63 1,708 1 
AVNDIS 
(5 Years) 
Average number of disasters during the 
past five years. 
124 270 2.17 3,516 1.6 
PBATH 
 
Per capita number of public baths  0.21*10-3 0.07*10-3 0.33 0.49*10-3 0.09*10-3 
CENTE 
 
Per capita number of community centers 0.22*10-3 0.17*10-3 0.77 0.90*10-3 0.07*10-3 
FFIGHT 
 
Per capita number of fire fighting teams 0.31*10-3 0.14*10-3 0.45 0.62*10-3 0.04*10-3 
POLIC 
 
Number of policemen 4,763 6,536 1.37 42,197 1,069 
IMIG 
 
Share of immigrants from other 
prefectures a) 
21*10-3 5*10-3 0.26 42*10-3 10*10-3 
POP Population numbersa) 
 
2,648 2,393 0.90 11,900 616 
PORAT 
 
The share of those receiving public 
assistance 
7.45*10-3 4.52*10-3 0.606 28.6*10-3 1.77*10-3 
OLDRAT 
 
The share of elderly over 70 years old. 0.11 0.02 0.24 0.19 0.05 
INCOM 
 
Per capita income b) 2,838 408 0.14 4.813 1.915 
Notes: a) expressed in thousands 
     b) expressed in thousands of yen. 
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Table 2.Distribution of victims 
Percentile  
10 1 
 
20 5 
 
30 12.7 
 
40 26.6 
 
50 67 
 
60 139 
 
70 
 
266 
80 594 
 
90 
 
1645 
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                         Table 3  Determinants of the number of victims (Zero inflated negative-binominal model) 
 (1)  
1Year 
(2) 
3Years 
(3) 
5 Years 
(4) 
1 Year 
(5) 
3 Years 
(6) 
5 Years 
(7) 
1 Year 
(8) 
3 Years 
(9) 
5 Years 
(10) 
1 Year 
(11) 
3 Years 
(12) 
5 Years 
NDIS 
 
0.41** 
(3.90) 
0.42** 
(3.85) 
0.42** 
(3.88) 
0.41** 
(3.89) 
0.42** 
(3.86) 
0.42** 
(3.88) 
0.41** 
(3.86) 
0.42** 
(3.83) 
0.42** 
(3.89) 
0.41** 
(3.87) 
0.42** 
(3.84) 
0.42** 
(3.88) 
AVNDIS 
 
-0.05* 
(-1.95) 
-0.06* 
(-1.96) 
-0.02 
(-1.02) 
         
PBATH 
 
-0.004 
(-0.02) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.40) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.08 
(0.30) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
PBATH* 
  AVNDIS 
   -0.06** 
(-7.49) 
-0.04* 
(-1.96) 
-0.01 
(-0.64) 
      
CENTE -0.36** 
(-2.60) 
-0.38** 
(-2.72) 
-0.31* 
(-2.17) 
-0.34** 
(-2.54) 
-0.37** 
(-2.70) 
-0.33* 
(-2.23) 
-0.26* 
(-1.74) 
-0.29* 
(-2.14) 
-0.33* 
(-2.11) 
-0.35** 
(-2.60) 
-0.38** 
(-2.76) 
-0.31* 
(-2.13) 
CENTE* 
  AVNDIS 
      -0.05** 
(-2.95) 
-0.07** 
(-2.58) 
-0.003 
(-0.37) 
   
FFIGHT -0.12 
(-0.47) 
-0.10 
(-0.37) 
-0.12 
(-0.45) 
-0.13 
(-0.49) 
-0.11 
(-0.41) 
-0.13 
(-0.48) 
-0.16 
(-0.59) 
-0.12 
(-0.44) 
-0.13 
(-0.50) 
-0.06 
(-0.26) 
-0.06 
(-0.22) 
-0.10 
(-0.39) 
FFIGHT* 
  AVNDIS 
         -0.08** 
(-8.81) 
-0.05* 
(-2.24) 
-0.02 
(-0.99) 
POLIC 0.24 
(1.02) 
0.25 
(1.06) 
0.25 
(1.07) 
0.24 
(1.05) 
0.25 
(1.05) 
0.25 
(1.09) 
0.27 
(1.16) 
0.25 
(1.08) 
0.26 
(1.10) 
0.26 
(1.11) 
0.25 
(1.07) 
0.25 
(1.08) 
IMIG 
 
0.84* 
(2.15) 
0.93* 
(2.31) 
0.85* 
(2.15) 
0.87* 
(2.21) 
0.90* 
(2.25) 
0.83* 
(2.09) 
0.84* 
(2.13) 
0.89* 
(2.25) 
0.81* 
(2.04) 
0.87* 
(2.21) 
0.92* 
(2.28) 
0.84* 
(2.12) 
POP 4.47** 
(4.46) 
4.50** 
(4.54) 
4.44** 
(4.46) 
4.49** 
(4.54) 
4.43** 
(4.49) 
4.42** 
(4.44) 
4.58** 
(4.62) 
4.48** 
(4.55) 
4.41** 
(4.43) 
4.50** 
(4.54) 
4.44** 
(4.50) 
4.42** 
(4.43) 
PORAT 
 
0.31 
(1.41) 
0.29 
(1.29) 
0.32 
(1.40) 
0.32 
(1.43) 
0.30 
(1.30) 
0.32 
(1.49) 
0.32 
(1.44) 
0.28 
(1.25) 
0.33 
(1.45) 
0.29 
(1.31) 
0.28 
(1.23) 
0.32 
(1.40) 
OLDRAT 
 
1.60* 
(1.67) 
1.69* 
(1.76) 
1.64* 
(1.70) 
1.62* 
(1.70) 
1.72* 
(1.79) 
1.66* 
(1.73) 
1.59* 
(1.66) 
1.70* 
(1.77) 
1.67* 
(1.73) 
1.59* 
(1.67) 
1.72* 
(1.79) 
1.64* 
(1.70) 
INCOM 
 
-3.89** 
(-2.92) 
-4.21** 
(-3.21) 
-4.15** 
(-3.14) 
-3.98** 
(-3.05) 
-4.30** 
(-3.24) 
-4.16** 
(-3.13) 
-4.09** 
(-3.11) 
-4.33** 
(-3.29) 
-4.14** 
(-3.11) 
-4.08** 
(-3.12) 
-4.37** 
(-3.28) 
-4.18** 
(-3.16) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Logit Model     
NDIS 
 
4.58* 
(2.21) 
4.59* 
(2.28) 
4.56* 
(2.22) 
4.51* 
(2.20) 
4.56* 
(2.25) 
4.58* 
(2.22) 
4.49* 
(2.15) 
4.49* 
(2.24) 
4.60* 
(2.22) 
4.51* 
(2.21) 
4.58* 
(2.27) 
4.56* 
(2.21) 
NDIS* 
Ln(INCOM) 
-0.22 
(-0.83) 
-0.22 
(-0.87) 
-0.21 
(-0.83) 
-0.21 
(-0.81) 
-0.22 
(-0.85) 
-0.22 
(-0.83) 
-0.20 
(-0.76) 
-0.21 
(-0.83) 
-0.22 
(-0.84) 
-0.21 
(-0.82) 
-0.22 
(-0.87) 
-0.21 
(-0.83) 
NDIS* 
Ln(POP) 
-0.21** 
(-2.77) 
-0.21** 
(-2.90) 
-0.21** 
(-2.88) 
-0.21** 
(-2.91) 
-0.21** 
(-2.90) 
-0.21** 
(-2.87) 
-0.21** 
(-2.91) 
-0.21** 
(-2.91) 
-0.21** 
(-2.86) 
-0.21** 
(-2.79) 
-0.21** 
(-2.90) 
-0.21** 
(-2.87) 
 2.57** 
(45.8) 
2.57** 
(45.8) 
2.57** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.9) 
2.53** 
(45.9) 
2.53** 
(45.9) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
Samples 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 658 
Non-zero samples 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 
Notes: Each column of this table reports a separate estimate of a zero inflated negative binominal model. As discussed in the text, this model has two equations.  The lower panel of the table reports the logit 
model estimates of the probability that nobody becomes a victim of a natural disaster. The upper panel reports the results from the negative binominal regression where numbers are elastic and are evaluated at 
the sample mean values of the dependent and each independent variable, and values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by the delta method using robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at 
the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  In each estimate, constants, year dummies, rates of primary industry populations, number of households, and hours of sunlight are included but not reported to save space 
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                        Table 4.  Determinants of the number of victims (Zero inflated negative-binominal model)  Number of victims<100 
 (1)  
1Year 
(2) 
3Years 
(3) 
5 Years 
(4) 
1 Year 
(5) 
3 Years 
(6) 
5 Years 
(7) 
1 Year 
(8) 
3 Years 
(9) 
5 Years 
(10) 
1 Year 
(11) 
3 Years 
(12) 
5 Years 
NDIS 
 
0.18 
(1.10) 
0.19 
(1.24) 
0.19 
(1.21) 
0.18 
(1.13) 
0.19 
(1.20) 
0.18 
(1.19) 
0.18 
(1.09) 
0.18 
(1.17) 
0.18 
(1.18) 
0.18 
(1.08) 
0.19 
(1.17) 
0.19 
(1.21) 
AVNDIS 
 
-0.03** 
(-3.66) 
-0.07* 
(-1.81) 
-0.01 
(-0.66) 
         
PBATH 
 
0.05 
(0.23) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.37) 
0.13 
(0.53) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.33) 
0.10 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.32) 
0.08 
(0.35) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
PBATH* 
  AVNDIS 
   -0.02** 
(-4.31) 
-0.04* 
(-1.99) 
-0.004 
(-0.29) 
      
CENTE -0.20* 
(-1.79) 
-0.19* 
(-1.73) 
-0.17 
(-1.42) 
-0.19* 
(-1.76) 
-0.17 
(-1.57) 
-0.18 
(-1.48) 
-0.15 
(-1.34) 
-0.12 
(-0.92) 
-0.18 
(-1.47) 
-0.20* 
(-1.85) 
-0.19* 
(-1.72) 
-0.16 
(-1.36) 
CENTE* 
  AVNDIS 
      -0.02* 
(-1.87) 
-0.03 
(-0.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
   
FFIGHT -0.22 
(-1.17) 
-0.21 
(-1.14) 
-0.22 
(-1.16) 
-0.22 
(-1.19) 
-0.23 
(-1.22) 
-0.22 
(-1.17) 
-0.22 
(-1.15) 
-0.22 
(-1.18) 
-0.22 
(-1.17) 
-0.19 
(-1.00) 
-0.15 
(-0.80) 
-0.21 
(-1.09) 
FFIGHT* 
  AVNDIS 
         -0.03** 
(-5.87) 
-0.06** 
(-2.83) 
-0.01 
(-0.86) 
POLIC -0.17 
(-1.36) 
-0.16 
(-1.28) 
-0.17 
(-1.32) 
-0.17 
(1.39) 
-0.17 
(-1.36) 
-0.17 
(-1.33) 
-0.16 
(-1.32) 
-0.16 
(-1.28) 
-0.17 
(1.33) 
-0.17 
(-1.39) 
-0.16 
(-1.28) 
-0.17 
(-1.32) 
IMIG 
 
0.05 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.07 
(0.23) 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
POP 1.43* 
(2.23) 
1.59** 
(2.43) 
1.31* 
(2.07) 
1.36* 
(2.13) 
1.48* 
(2.31) 
1.29* 
(2.03) 
1.40* 
(2.22) 
1.48* 
(2.25) 
1.28* 
(2.01) 
1.38* 
(2.19) 
1.58** 
(2.47) 
1.30* 
(2.06) 
PORAT 
 
0.14 
(1.05) 
0.14 
(1.05) 
0.14 
(1.01) 
0.13 
(0.97) 
0.14 
(1.01) 
0.13 
(0.99) 
0.13 
(0.98) 
0.14 
(1.01) 
0.13 
(0.98) 
0.12 
(0.92) 
0.13 
(0.94) 
0.14 
(100) 
OLDRAT 
 
-1.00 
(-1.41) 
-1.05 
(-1.47) 
-1.12 
(-1.52) 
-1.01 
(-1.41) 
-1.05 
(-1.46) 
-1.09 
(-1.48) 
-1.07 
(-1.50) 
-1.12 
(-1.53) 
-1.08 
(-1.48) 
-1.01 
(-1.43) 
-1.06 
(-1.49) 
-1.14 
(-1.55) 
INCOM 
 
0.77 
(0.69) 
0.86 
(0.77) 
0.80 
(0.71) 
0.68 
(0.62) 
0.76 
(0.69) 
0.75 
(0.67) 
0.73 
(0.66) 
0.79 
(0.71) 
0.74 
(0.67) 
0.68 
(0.61) 
0.78 
(0.70) 
0.80 
(0.71) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Logit Model     
NDIS 
 
2.86* 
(1.83) 
2.95* 
(1.86) 
2.87* 
(1.87) 
2.85* 
(1.84) 
2.85* 
(1.85) 
2.86* 
(1.82) 
2.79* 
(1.83) 
2.81* 
(1.83) 
2.86* 
(1.82) 
2.85* 
(1.84) 
2.90* 
(2.27) 
2.58* 
(1.81) 
NDIS* 
Ln(INCOM) 
-0.45 
(-0.17) 
-0.05 
(-0.19) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
-0.04 
(-0.16) 
-0.04 
(-0.16) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
-0.03 
(-0.13) 
-0.03 
(-0.13) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
-0.04 
(-0.18) 
-0.04 
(-0.18) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
NDIS* 
Ln(POP) 
-0.18** 
(-2.44) 
-0.19** 
(-2.41) 
-0.19*** 
(-2.42) 
-0.18** 
(-2.46) 
-0.19** 
(-2.44) 
-0.19** 
(-2.43) 
-0.18** 
(-2.45) 
-0.19** 
(-2.42) 
-0.19** 
(-2.43) 
-0.18** 
(-2.46) 
-0.18** 
(-2.43) 
-0.19** 
(-2.42) 
 2.57** 
(45.8) 
2.57** 
(45.8) 
2.57** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.9) 
2.53** 
(45.9) 
2.53** 
(45.9) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
2.53** 
(45.8) 
Samples 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
Non-zero samples 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Notes: Each column of this table reports a separate estimate of a zero inflated negative binominal model. As discussed in the text, this model has two equations.  The lower panel of the table reports the logit 
model estimates of the probability that nobody becomes a victim of a natural disaster. The upper panel reports the results from the negative binominal regression where numbers are elastic and are evaluated at 
the sample mean values of the dependent and each independent variable, and values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by the delta method using robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at 
the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  In each estimate, constants, year dummies, rates of primary industry‟ populations, number of households, and hours of sunlight are included but not reported to save space 
